Why has the completion of the single market in financial services proved so difficult and time consuming? This paper addresses this question by applying a revised version of the 'advocacy coalition framework', modified so as to incorporate the role of material interests as well as ideas, to the empirical record of the policy-making processes of key pieces of legislation dealing with securities trading in the EU.
Introduction
More than half a century after the signing of the Treaty of Rome and the re-launch of the single market programme in the mid 1980s to be completed in 1992, financial market integration was far from being achieved in the European Union (EU) in the early 21 century (for an overview of financial market integration in Europe since the 1960s see Story and Walter 1997, Maes 2007 ; other literature focusing on the 1980s and the early 1990s is reviewed in Section 2). Moreover, as elaborated in this paper, several financial directives negotiated throughout the 2000s proved to be as politically controversial as the previous sets of directives agreed in the mid 1980s and early 1990s. This is puzzling. Why has the completion of the single market in financial services proved so difficult and time consuming? Can any lessons be drawn for the completion of the single market in other sectors?
The Financial Services Action Plan (FSAP) and the introduction of the single currency in 1999 gave new momentum to financial market integration in the EU.
Compared to banking and insurance, securities is the sector of most intense activity in the 2000s, partly because market integration had lagged behind in this field (Story and Walter 1997) and a period of catch-up was therefore overdue, and partly because technical innovations increased the potential for cross-border securities trading (Underhill 1997) . Moreover, unlike the banking sector, where international rules, such as the Basel II Accord, are well developed due to the activity of the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (Wood 2005) , securities markets are subject to limited international regulation. Hence, EU regulatory activity in the securities sector was all the more necessary. As pointed out in Section 2 that reviews the literature on the politics of financial market integration in the EU, existing explanations have so far focused on one set of actors -the Commission, the member states, industry, mainly transnational companies -highlighting the importance of economic interests in shaping financial services regulation. This research takes a different theoretical approach, using a revised version of the 'advocacy coalition framework' (Sabatier 1998) , modified so as to incorporate the role of material interests as well as ideas, as elaborated in Section 3.
It is argued that in the making of these directives, the main (but, by no means, the only) line of division was between a 'Northern European' coalition (hereafter referred to as 'Northern coalition') and a 'Southern European' one (hereafter referred to as 'Southern coalition'). This was due to differences in the national regulatory frameworks, the configuration of national financial systems and their competitiveness (hence, 'interests'). However, the tension was also due to different 'belief systems' (hence, 'ideas') about financial services regulation. Basically, there was a 'marketmaking', 'principle-based' approach, exposed by policy-makers and stakeholders in the UK, Ireland, the Netherlands and the Scandinavian countries; and a 'marketshaping', 'rule-based' approach of continental Europe (France, Belgium and the Mediterranean countries) with Germany in-between due to the presence of competing advocacy coalitions domestically.
These competing belief systems concerning financial services regulation proved to be one of the main hindrances to be overcome in the making of an integrated market in securities. The rules set in place for the completion of the single market in the early 2000s were the result of negotiations between these two coalitions, and were based on a series of compromises, even though the new rules tended to be closer to the preferences of the Northern coalition. This outcome is explained by the bargaining power of its members, which in turn was affected by the changes in the policy environment and some learning that took place across coalitions. This paper makes two main contributions to the scholarly literature on the completion of single market and to the political economy literature more broadly. It teases out and elaborates the belief systems of policy makers and examines the composition of and 5 the interaction between two main advocacy coalitions shaping the politics of financial market regulation in the EU. Second, it argues that the long-standing divide between Northern Europe and Southern Europe concerning financial market integration is not only due to dissimilar (often competing) economic interests. It is also due to different ideas about financial services regulation, even though the ideational distance has been reduced over time.
State of the art on the politics of financial market integration in the EU
Several different answers have been given by political scientists as to what drives financial market integration in the EU. Story and Walter (1997) stressed the intergovernmental character of the negotiations concerning financial market regulation in the EU in the 1970s, 1980s and early 1990s. Their work regarded financial market integration as the 'battle of the systems' (which is part of the title of the book), whereby the member states were keen to set EU rules that were in line with their domestic regulatory approach and did not create comparative disadvantages or adjustment costs to national industry and the public authorities. A similar approach was also taken by Underhill (1997) , who, like Story and Walter, highlighted how the 'triangle' of the three main financial systems in the EU -the British, the French and the German -played out and shaped EU financial regulation in the 1980s and early 1990s.
A second explanation considers the Commission as the core supranational actor pushing through financial market integration (Posner 2005 , Jabko 2006 (Coen and Thatcher 2008; De Visscher et al. 2008; Quaglia 2008a) , an approach which, however, has limited explanatory power in the making of level 1 legislation, even though it is more fruitful when applied to level 2 legislation.
Each of these approaches has some explanatory power concerning certain aspects of financial market integration and specific stages of the policy-making process of the main pieces of legislation regulating financial services in the EU, as elaborated in section 6. For example, they shed light onto the agenda setting of the Commission at the pre-legislative and drafting stage; the pace setting of transnational industry in calling for financial market integration; the intergovernamental character of the decision-making process in the Council, where the battle of the systems and the preferences of domestic industry come to the fore; and the committee governance at work in the implementation stage. However, what all these explanations have in common is that they tend to focus on one set of actors -the member states (to be precise, the three main member states), the Commission and transnational industryand stress the importance of material economic interests in shaping the political conflicts concerning financial market regulation in the EU. This paper argues that in doing so they have overlooked an important part of the explanation: the 'belief systems' of policy makers. This research adopts a different theoretical approach, using a revised version of the 'advocacy coalition framework', modified so as to incorporate the role of material interests as well as ideas, as elaborated in Section 3. This approach has been chosen to shed light onto the politics 7 of financial market regulation in the EU because it adopts a pluralistic view of the policy process and outcome that fits well with the multi-level governance of the EU (on multi-level governance see Hooghe and Marks 2001, Bache and Flinders 2004) .
In fact, advocacy coalitions consist of public and private actors, situated at different levels of governance: national, EU and international (on the use of the advocacy coalition framework in EU policy-making see Radaelli 1999, Dudley and Richardson 1999) . Moreover, the advocacy coalition framework offers the possibility of considering the role played by non-material factors, such as ideas, in shaping financial market integration in the EU.
With specific reference to market regulation, Vogel (1996: 20) highlights the importance of ideas or 'regimes orientation', defined as 'state actors' beliefs about the proper scope, goals, and methods of government intervention in the economy, and about how this intervention affects economic performance'. However, it is not only state actors that are involved in this process, it also affects private actors (industry). Hancher and Moran (1989: 4) use the broader expression of regulatory 'culture' about 'the rules of the regulatory game': that is the 'purpose of regulation', 'legitimate participants and their relations with each other'. Such culture tends to be context specific, as it varies across time, countries and sector (Hancher and Moran 1989) . EU regulation is an arena where different regulatory approaches come to the fore and confront each other, which is why EU regulation is often a 'patchwork' of national regulatory styles (Heritier 1996: 149) .
The advocacy coalition framework in theory and practice
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An advocacy coalition is formed by 'actors from various governmental and private organizations who both (a) share a set of normative and causal beliefs and (b) engage in a nontrivial degree of co-ordinated activity over time' (Sabatier 1998: 103) . One or more coalitions can be present within a policy subsystem, which is composed by a set of policy-makers and stakeholders who are actively concerned with a certain issue, regularly seeking to influence public policy related to it. As Sabatier (1998: 103) specifies, 'the belief system' of an advocacy coalition is organised into a 'hierarchical, tripartite structure': i) the 'deep core' of the shared belief system includes basic ontological and normative beliefs; ii) the 'policy core' beliefs, which represent the causal perceptions by the coalition (the definition of the problem, its causes and solutions) and are its fundamental 'glue'; and iii) the secondary aspects of the coalition's belief system, comprising instrumental considerations on how to implement the policy core (e.g. minor decisions concerning budgetary allocations, administrative regulations) (Surel 2000) , and which can vary somewhat among different members.
An important issue that needs to be discussed with reference to this theoretical approach is the role of interests as opposed to -or distinct from -ideas and values. As originally elaborated, advocacy coalitions are primarily value-based coalitions (Dudley and Richardson 1999) . Members of the coalitions are assumed to be instrumentally rational, following the course of action that is more likely to achieve the objectives determined by their cognitive and normative beliefs (Sabatier 1998: 109 ). Yet, some authors point out that ideas and interests are 'not separate entities, only analytically separable ones' (Jacobsen 1995: 309, see also Dudley and Richardson 1999) , especially in the economic field. Economic ideas matter because they are 'clusters of ideas/interests' (Jacobsen 1995: 309) that help actors to define their objectives.
In many policy-oriented studies and empirically grounded research, especially in the economic field, it is difficult to neatly separate ideas and interests and it can be somewhat naïve to identify coalitions based purely on values or ideas. At the same time, as this paper argues, to identify coalitions based purely on interests might overlook an important part of the explanation. On the one hand, there are massive and powerful economic interests at stake in financial services. On the other hand, ideas in the form of technical knowledge (Radaelli 1995 and policy paradigms (Hall 1993) 1 are important in this complex and 'technical' policy area.
Interests can be quite easily incorporated into the advocacy coalition framework, which also considers power, in that rival coalitions compete for power in the policy subsystem in which they operate. The framework postulates that changes in the policy environment -such as changes in socioeconomic and political conditions (Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith 1999 ) -can trigger a shift the power distribution among coalitions and their members (Kuebler 2001) . Moreover, Sabatier (1998: 116) acknowledges that distributional conflicts are important especially for 'material groups', the members of which seek to maximise their own material self interest. This type of groups represents the vast majority of actors in the financial services subsystem.
1 A policy paradigm can be defined as a shared body of causal ideas concerning a certain policy area.
A useful distinction can be made between the most normative part of the paradigm, and ideas about the main policy objectives, instruments and strategies (Hall 1993) . To a large extent this resembles the tripartite division of beliefs used in the advocacy coalition framework, examined below.
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This paper does not test an interest-based explanation versus an idea-based explanation, feeding into the rationalist -constructivist divide (Checkel 1997 , Jupille et al. 2003 . The 'deep core' of the shared belief system of each coalition includes basic ontological and normative beliefs about the market, which can be summarised as 'market trust' for the Northern coalition and 'market distrust' for the Southern one.
The 'policy core' beliefs concern:
(i) the definition of the problem: whereas completing the single market is more or less a shared objective for both coalitions (though with a different degree of intensity, being more important for the Northern group), the Northern coalition prioritises market liberalisation, mainly through market-making measures that define conditions for market access and operation, stimulating competition and market efficiency (cf Knill and Lehmkuhl 1999) . The Southern coalition prioritises re-regulation at the EU level, through market-shaping measures that pursue policy objectives other than market liberalisation, such as consumer protection and financial stability, with a view to complement the liberalisation process;
(ii) the content of regulation: light-touch regulation, principle-based, and competitionfriendly is endorsed by the Northern group, whereas prescriptive regulation, rulebased, prioritising consumer protection is favoured by the Southern one;
(iii) the relationship between the public authorities and industry: the Northern group believes in private sector governance (cf Knill and Lehmkuhl 2002) , based on the involvement of industry through consultation, drafting and implementing soft law; the Southern group believes in the steering action of the public authorities, to be kept at arm's length from the private sector.
The secondary aspects of the coalition's belief system vary somewhat among different members. They partly depend on the specific situation in which the various members of each coalition find themselves, such as the degree of competitiveness, the market share and organisational structure for private actors; the organisational structure and institutional prerogatives for public actors. These secondary beliefs are not considered in this paper, given the considerable number of policy-makers and stakeholders involved.
The Prospectuses directive (2003)
The Prospectus directive allowed capital to be raised throughout the EU on the basis of one set of documents -the prospectus -and gave bond issuers a choice of regulator. reached on the duration on of the vetting period, and the competent authorities were enabled to grant exemptions from disclosure requirements for some enterprises (Ferran 2004) . Eventually, an agreement based on a package deal between the EP and the Council was put together, whereby companies that issued bonds (but not shares)
above Euros 1,000 would have a choice of regulator, which would de facto give freedom of choice to the vast majority of issuers (Financial Times, 1 July 2003).
As pointed out in several interviews, besides being a clash of national interests -the national governments were keen to set in place rules that were most advantageous for their financial centres -it was also a matter of different belief systems, based on different deep normative beliefs: market trust and market distrust. As for policy core beliefs, the Northern coalition privileged a 'market-making' regulatory approach, based on 'light-touch' rules, competition (also amongst supervisory authorities) and freedom of choice for industry. The Southern coalition preferred a 'market-shaping' regulatory approach, based on prescriptive rules, with emphasis on consumer protection and limited choice for industry.
In Northern Europe and Anglo Saxon countries, the prospectus is considered as an information tool, not a consumer protection tool: it is 'light' and it is not vetted by regulators. In Southern Europe, including France, the prospectus is seen as a consumer protection tool: the information in it has to be detailed and is vetted by the regulators (interview, London, 12 May 2007) . This also highlights different visions of the role of the public authorities vis a vis the market. The Northern approach stresses the ability of the market to regulate itself within the limits sets by light touch regulation. The Southern approach stresses the public authorities' role in steering and monitoring the market.
The Markets in Financial Instruments directive (MiFID) (2004)
The MiFID was a core part of the FSAP, being described by financial press as the (Ferran 2004 ). The directive set common rules for securities and derivatives markets, permitting investment firms to operate throughout the EU by using a 'single passport', which allowed financial firms to conduct business across Europe with the approval of their home authorities.
Investment firms were enabled to process client orders outside regulated markets (first and foremost, stock exchanges), which was previously impossible in some member states. This was the so called 'concentration rule', which had been one of the main bones of contention in the negotiations of the ISD in 1993, as it was a priority for
France and the Southern European countries, which had this rule in place (Coleman and Underhill 1998, Underhill 1997) . The public authorities in these countries believed that the market for securities trading should be carefully regulated and In so doing, they also protected their national stock exchanges from competition from 'multilateral trading facilities' (i.e. broadly non-exchange trading platforms) and 'systematic internalisers' (i.e. banks or investment firms that systematically execute client orders internally on own account, rather than sending them to exchanges). Such competition was already in place in some member states, such as the UK. This approach is competition friendly, even though it can reduce investor protection if adequate pre-trade and post-trade requirements are not set in place (for a debate on this issue see the various contributions to the volume edited by Ferrarini and Wymeersch 2006) . This was the most controversial issue in the negotiations of the MiFID.
The second controversial issue, which was related to the first one, was 'pre-trade transparency' that referred to publishing the prices of securities, hence the obligation by which investment firms have to reveal to the markets details of client orders. If the firms are trading on their own account, they should provide some indication of the terms on which they themselves stand ready to buy or sell a specified share (Ferrarini and Wymeersch 2006) . As pointed out in several interviews, this issue was particularly important for the Southern coalition, which wanted clear rules for all the market players, including investment banks and financial firms, which are by definition 'non regulated markets'. Oversimplifying only slightly, whereas the Northern coalition wanted to keep them by and large 'unregulated', opposing pretrade transparency requirements, the Southern coalition wanted to impose prescriptive rules concerning pre-trade transparency, presented as a tool for investor protection.
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The difficulty was to produce pre-trade transparency requirements which were workable, because if the obligations were too onerous to comply with, investment firms would not compete with exchanges -they would not 'internalise', i. 
Explaining the completion of the single market in financial services
In an overall assessment, to what extent is the advocacy coalition framework useful to explain the completion of the single market in financial services? Does this shed novel light onto the policy process and outcome? To address these questions, it is necessary to ask which were the most important actors and why? How did policymakers and stakeholders define their policy preferences? And how were such preferences pursued in the policy process and with what outcome?
The Commission was particularly influential at the agenda setting stage, meaning in drafting the directives, which however had the support of the national governments.
Following the terminology used in other studies adopting an advocacy coalition framework (cf Dudley and Richardson 1999), the Commission was a 'policy broker' (Sabatier 1998) . However, whenever the draft regulation produced by the Commission was not in line with the policy preferences of one of the two competing coalitions identified, the rules had to be substantially redrafted by the Commission in second reading.
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The EP was an important channel through which industry was able to articulate its policy preferences, as revealed in several interviews. MEPs were lobbied by and actively encouraged interaction with industry, seeking information and expertise (cf Bouwen 2004), producing reports and trying to understand the issues. MEPs were accessible and willing to listen to business, working across party lines and national lines. The European Parliament, and particularly the relevant committee, proved to be closer to the Northern coalition, exhibiting a market-friendly approach, receptive of the preferences put forward by the most competitive parts of the financial industry, generally located in the UK and to some extent in Germany and France. Since three out of four directives in the securities sector were adopted in second reading, the EP was able to have many of its proposed amendments incorporated into the final draft, albeit many member states also supported those changes.
The member states (to be precise, the national governments, particularly the Treasury and Finance Ministries) were key players at the decision making stage because the ECOFIN Council had ultimate decision making power, together with the EP. The coalitions of member states varied depending on the directive being negotiated and the specific issues dealt with, even though the traditional line of friction was between countries, such as the UK, Ireland, the Netherlands, and the Nordic countries embracing a market-making, competition-friendly, principle-based approach; and the market-shaping, rule-based, investor protection approach adopted by France, Italy, and the other Mediterranean countries; with Germany switching position -and hence coalition -depending on the specific content of the legislation being negotiated.
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The positions of the national governments in the negotiations reflected the preferences of powerful domestic groups, especially in those countries, such as the UK, where there is traditionally an intense and constructive interaction between the public authorities and industry (Josselin 1997 , Moran 1991 . In some cases, it also reflected the preferences of the public authorities, even when they differed from those exposed by the national industry, or part if it, in particular in countries, such as Germany, which has a federal structure (viz the MiFID and the large private banks). This was particularly the case in France and Italy, where there is traditionally a strong steering action by the state with limited consultation with the private sector (Josselin 1997 , Grossman 2005 , albeit this has began to change in the last decades or so (interview, Paris, 18 July 2007 , Brussels, 27 June 2007 .
The large member states, which are also those with the largest financial sector in the EU, were the most influential in the Council, followed by some of the old member states with a relatively large financial sector, and were followed by the new member states that have a smaller financial sector, which also tends to be foreign owned.
Moreover, the new member states joined the EU in 2004, when the negotiations on the Lamflaussy directives were either already ended or close to be completed. It will be interesting to see how they position themselves in the future, whether they will become part of one of the two existing coalitions, reshaping it, or whether a new coalition will emerge. After all, enlargement can be regarded as a considerable change of the policy environment, altering the power distribution amongst the members of the policy subsystem. Given the economic significance of the issues dealt with, the focal points of agreement for the formation of coalitions in the negotiations were generally given by overlapping or compatible interests (hence, they were coalitions of 'interests') even though the prevailing beliefs of policy-makers also played a role. The two competing belief systems can be characterised as follows. The Anglo Saxon approach is marketmaking, in favour of light-touch, principles-based, competition-friendly regulation, even when this implies a trade off with consumer protection. This approach is rooted in common law and is based on market trust. The Continental approach is marketshaping, rules-based and heavily regulated, with emphasis on consumer protection, even when this reduces competition. This approach is rooted in the Napoleonic code and is based on market distrust. In the governance of financial services, the EU is moving towards principle-based regulation, but this creates frictions between the two belief systems and the policy-makers and stakeholders subscribing to them.
Nonetheless, it is difficult to clearly separate belief systems (hence, ultimately ideas) from the features of the national financial system and regulatory issues related to the competitiveness of industry or specific preferences of market players (hence, interests). British policy-makers have traditionally adopted an internationalised free market approach, but this is also influenced by the large number of foreign owned companies (especially from the US) located in the City. French, Italian, Spanish policy-makers embrace a market-shaping inward-oriented approach, which is interconnected to the limited competitiveness of their financial sector. German policymakers also subscribe to a market-shaping policy, but given the competitiveness of part of their financial sector (private investment banks and financial conglomerates) tend to be more market oriented and competition friendly than France, Italy and Spain, even though this also depends on the specific issues being negotiated.
This remark also partly addresses a potential methodological pitfall of this research:
the role played by 'belief systems' (or regulatory paradigms) would have more explanatory power if there were instances in which ideas and interests suggested different choices to policy makers, with the ideational component carrying more weight in the policy process. Yet, precisely because regulatory paradigms and market configuration mutually affect each other it is not possible to find clear instances in which these two factors pointed in opposite directions, which is why this paper does not juxtapose interests versus ideas. Both sets of factors influence the completion of the single market in financial services.
The negotiations that took place between the two coalitions in the early 2000s resembled traditional EU bargaining based on trade offs, compromises (eg the home country supervisory approach for shares but not for bonds in the Prospectus directives, the definition of 'liquid shares' and 'standard market' size in the MiFID etc) and constructive ambiguity (eg decision on controversial issues were postponed, in some case national discretion was inserted in the text etc.). Although both coalitions managed to influence the policy process, the very completion of the single market in financial services was a clear success of the Northern coalition (Mügge 2006 , Bieling 2003 . Moreover, the new rules are to a considerable extent based on the belief system of this coalition. In the competition between these two coalitions, the Northern coalition by and large prevailed because of two interconnected reasons: the evolution of the policy environment and a process of learning (cf Radaelli 1999 in the case of EU tax harmonisation), both of which altered the bargaining power of its members.
As far as changes in the policy environment are concerned, the Northern coalition was empowered by the introduction of single currency, which increased financial market integration in the EU, and by the renewed competition between the EU and US in this field. In this environment, the completion of the single market in financial services became a priority for the EU and the market-making, competition-friendly approach was regarded as the most successful, providing a competitive model for the EU. In turn, this had implication for the learning process taking place between the coalitions and their members, but further research is needed on this.
Conclusion
The directives passed in the early 2000s and examined in this paper were designed to substantially increase financial market integration in the EU. The making of these directives, and especially the Prospectus and the MiFID, was characterised by the presence, the interactions and the influence in the policy process and eventually in the outcomes of two competing coalitions. On the one side, there was a market-making coalition, formed by Northern member states, their public authorities, industry, and many MEPs. On the other side, there was the market-shaping coalition, formed by Southern member states, parts of their industry and some MEPs.
The outcomes of the negotiations were often rather 'odd' compromise solutions between the positions exposed by these two coalitions, or the issue was left open, to be decided later on, as 'the devil is in the details' as one policy-maker colourfully put 28 it (interview, Brussels, 27 March 2007) . In some cases, the shortcoming of the compromise solutions adopted became apparent only when the directives were implemented. For example, the 'simplified' 'European prospectus' that was the objective of the Prospectus directive was not very simplified, because the directive was excessively convoluted. In other cases, the problem was the excessive use of national discretion and/or gold-plating by the national authorities.
Besides being slowed down by dissimilar (at times opposite) interests of the main policy-makers and stakeholders, the completion of the single market in securities was also rendered more complex by different (often competing) belief systems exposed by the main actors about securities trading regulation. Paraphrasing the title of the book of Story and Walters (1997) 
: Political Economy of Financial Integration in Europe:
The Battle of the Systems, financial market integration in the EU in the 21st century was not only the battle of the systems, it was also the battle of ideas (to be precise, belief systems) about the regulation of securities trading and financial markets more generally. The literature has so far focused on the role of interests in shaping financial market integration, whereas this research argues that the role of ideas in the form of regulatory paradigms, should also be considered for a thorough explanation of the politics of financial services regulation in the EU.
The main lesson to be drawn for the completion of the single market is that policymakers and academics need to pay attention to ideas (or belief systems) as well as Europe and worldwide might provide some ammunition to the advocates of a more prescriptive, less market-friendly approach to financial services regulation.
